Testing the effects of police body-worn cameras on use of force during arrests: A randomised controlled trial in a large British police force by Henstock, D & Ariel, Barak
European Journal of Criminology  
 
 
TITLE: 
 
Testing the Effects of Police Body-Born Cameras on Use of Force during Arrests: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial in a Large British Police Force  
 
 
Darren Henstock
 †
 and  Barak Ariel 
‡ 
 
 
  
†  Cantab. Police Executive Programme, Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge, 
Sidgwick Avenue Cambridge CB3 9DA UK, +44.1223.335360, dwh43@cam.ac.uk 
 
‡ Corresponding author; PhD, Lecturer, Institute of Criminology, Faculty of Law, Hebrew 
University, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 91905 Israel, +972.2.5882502; 
barak.ariel@mail.huji.ac.il; Lecturer in Experimental Criminology, Institute of Criminology, 
University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue Cambridge CB3 9DA UK, +44.1223.767378, 
ba285@cam.ac.uk 
 
 
The authors declare no conflict of interests 
 
 
  
The UK BWC RCT 
1 
 
TESTING THE EFFECTS OF POLICE BODY-BORN CAMERAS ON USE OF FORCE 
DURING ARRESTS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL IN A LARGE BRITISH 
POLICE FORCE  
 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
 
 There is, at present, a world-wide uncontrolled social experiment taking place within 
policing on body-worn-cameras, without much evidence from controlled studies  
 Our randomized-controlled-trial aims to reveal the conditions under which body-worn-
cameras can effect arrest dynamics in England and Wales 
 Scholars interested in use of force should differentiate between “compliant handcuffs” 
which are part of the arrest procedure rather than use-of-force per se, and “noncompliant 
handcuffing”, which form a step on the force continuum.  
 Overall, the odds of use of force while using body-worn-cameras are 50% lower than 
control conditions. However, the effect is statistically significant only when compliant 
handcuffing is removed from the definition of “use of force”.  
 Instead, the odds of reporting compliant handcuffing under treatment conditions increased 
by 40% compared to control conditions, which is likely to be a result of enhanced police 
accountability.  
 Overall, the effect of body-worn cameras in frontline policing is concentrated on “open-
end tactics” rather than more aggressive force responses (e.g., batons, Taser discharges, 
pepper spray, etc.). 
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TESTING THE EFFECTS OF POLICE BODY-BORN CAMERAS ON USE OF FORCE 
DURING ARRESTS: A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL IN A LARGE BRITISH 
POLICE FORCE  
 
ABSTRACT 
PURPOSE:  This study aims to assess the effect of body-worn cameras (BWCs) on police use of 
force, in a British Police Force context. 
METHODS: We tested the effect of BWCs with a large British force in a 6-month randomised-
controlled-trial. Police shifts (n=430) were randomly assigned on a weekly basis into treatment 
and control conditions. Odds ratios of use of force rates per arrests were used to estimate the 
causal impact of BWCs. Analyses of these odds for overall use of force and again within pre-
specified force categories were conducted.  
RESULTS: Overall 50% reduction in the odds of force used when BWCs are present compared 
to control conditions. Our estimates suggest a 35% reduction of overall weighted force in the 
treatment conditions compared to control conditions. However, the effect concentrates in open-
hand tactics (physical restraints and non-compliant handcuffing), with no discernible effect on 
categories of more aggressive force-responses (e.g., dogs, Taser, batons, pepper spray). Forty 
per cent “more force” was detected in treatment conditions for handcuffing non-combatant 
suspects.  
CONCLUSIONS: BWCs deter officers, offenders, or both, into complaint behaviour. 
Importantly, showing a conditional effect on force types can be further contextualized as 
enhanced transparency and accountability by the police, with greater reporting of use of force 
that would otherwise be concealed. Our findings illustrate the importance of analysing police 
use of force with and without compliant handcuffing of arrestees, which may or may not form 
part of the force continuum. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 2012, police Body-Worn-Cameras (BWCs) have received extensive media attention 
across the globe (Cubitt et al 2016; Lum et al 2015). All continents have a large number of law 
enforcement agencies either using or piloting BWCs. These small devices are perceived by 
many to be a promising way to achieve several aims in law enforcement, including reducing 
citizen complaints, reducing incidents of use of force, improving evidence gathering, improving 
public confidence and improving officers' self-legitimacy (White 2014). In the US, the use of 
BWCs has been recognized by the US White House and the President's Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing (COPS 2015). Another example for the reach of BWCs is the 12
th
 August 
2013 by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin of the Federal District Court in Manhattan, who ordered the 
NYPD to set up a one-year pilot program that would compel officers to wear cameras in the 
precincts where the most police stops were being performed (NY Times 12/08/2013).  In 
Europe, the UK College of Policing suggested that BWCs were the mechanism through which 
“dented public confidence” could be restored (BBC 24/10/2013). The idea that BWCs are an 
inevitable necessity and will soon be commonplace equipment for police officers is currently 
propagated in the media and driven by its manufacturers (Stratton et al 2014). 
 Despite these laudable claims, there is a shortage of evidence on the benefits of the 
BWC. A literature review of the evidence on the effectiveness of BWCs has suggested that, 
“despite vast information sources discussing BWC technology the operational evidence to 
support claims about either the pros or cons of this technology is sparse.” (Lum et al 2015; 
Stratton et al 2014:13).  
Of particular interest is the potential impact of these devices on police use of force, 
particularly at a time when police killings seem to be on the rise (Guardian 01/06/2015). 
Indeed, public as well as political interest in the possible effect of BWCs on police use of force 
is not surprising (Goldsmith 2010; Collins 2009). Use of force is a powerful talisman for those 
publicizing the wrongs of various police forces; a trawl of the internet reveals numerous videos 
of perceived police brutality (e.g., Brown 2015). While most UK forces have a greater level of 
public support than their US counterparts, there are nevertheless pockets, in most forces, where 
mistrust and lack of confidence characterize the community's perception of the police (Ariel 
2016). Various scholars (Terrill 2001; Geller and Toch 1996; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993) argue 
how officers’ use of force damages the public-police contract. Tensions that arise if the police 
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break this contract and the potentially catastrophic results that may follow can predicate social 
upheaval; the riots after the deaths of Rodney King (1992), Mark Duggan (2011), Michael 
Brown in Ferguson County, Missouri, as well as Alton Sterling in Louisiana (2016) and 
Philando Castile in Minnesota (2016). Thus, anything that can strengthen and reinforce the 
police-public contract is vitally important to modern police forces.  
BWCs have entered this discourse with a bang. To illustrate, while most agencies in the 
Western world are facing austerity measures, the Obama administration recently proposed 
spending $263 million on supporting the deployment of 50,000 cameras in the US (US Justice 
Department 1/05/15). Similarly, the Metropolitan Police announced the deploying of 20,000 
cameras at significant cost to the taxpayer (BBC 3/06/15; Greater London Authority 24/06/15). 
We suspect that most law-enforcement agencies worldwide will embark on a similar journey by 
massively purchasing these devices, in just a few years. 
Much like other pivotal moments in criminal justice research history (e.g., Sherman and 
Berk 1984), the opportunity exists to help guide policy with evidence. Yet the scope of research 
on these devices is limited, but is also underpinned by evidence which reflects varying degrees 
of methodological rigor (Lum et al 2015). Thus far, there have only been only a handful of 
published experiments on the effect of BWCs on police use of force: first there is the Rialto 
study (Ariel, Farrar and Sutherland 2014) and the Cambridge University replication studies 
(Ariel et al., 2016a, 2016b, 2016c). Second, a notable study was conducted in Meza (Ready and 
Young, 2015), and (third), the Orlando Experiment (Jennings, Lynch and Fridell 2015). There 
have also been a few quasi-experiments (e.g., Katz et al 2014), but overall the literature is not 
characterized by the mature body of rigorous evidence such as the hot spots experiments (Braga 
et al 2012) or face to face restorative justice conferencing (Sherman et al 2015).  To the best of 
our knowledge, there have been no published rigorous tests of the effect of BWCs, under 
satisfactory controlled settings, outside the US. This study is the first completed test of BWCs 
in a British metropolitan police force, aiming to replicate the Rialto study in a large force and 
within specific settings. This study also seeks to complicate the Rialto study with a more 
granular analysis of “force” – not simply as a dichotomous outcome, but rather as a scale, with 
greater emphasis on force categories than a binary variable. As we argue, these analyses echo 
theoretical debates about policing in late modernity, including accountability, transparency and 
social control practices more broadly. 
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We begin by briefly reviewing the relevant literature on police use of force, followed by a 
review of the literature on BWCs. We pay particular attention to ways in which these devices 
are hypothesized to reduce the prevalence and severity of force in police-public contacts. We 
then move on to describe the methods we used to estimate the causal inference of the effect of 
the devices on police use of force, and how we captured data on these incidents. A manual read 
of 590 arrest records that had taken place during the experimental period, some with and some 
without logs on use of force, injuries to suspects and details about the interaction - which are 
captured independently by custody officers as part of their routine booking procedures – was 
conducted, in order to identify various dimensions of these aggressive encounters. The 
outcomes are presented next, followed by a discussion of the findings for future research and 
considerations for implementation of BWCs in police departments worldwide.   
 
POLICE USE OF FORCE 
 The Peelian principles that underpin modern policing suggest that the degree to which 
public co-operation can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of 
physical force by the police. Policing by consent means that the police should only use physical 
force to the extent necessary to secure observance of the law, or to restore order, when the 
exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient (Lentz 2007).  To that 
effect, Bittner (1970:38) contended that “no matter what task the police are involved with, 
police intervention means making use of the authority and ability to overpower resistance.”  
Since this auspicious statement was made, there have been multiple studies of the many aspects 
of police use of force (Wolf et al 2009, Alpert and Dunham 1997, 2004; Sherman 1980, Garner 
et al 2002; Reiss 1968). Ariel et al (2014:511) suggested that “this scholastic interest reflects 
significant investment by practitioners and decision-makers in better understanding the ways in 
which law enforcement institutions exercise their power, and how such powers are managed.” 
Society presents the police force with a paradox in that in order to stop violence, police officers 
may have to use violence (Sherman 1980). Indeed, some researchers have claimed that the 
reason people call the police for help is based on their belief that force may be necessary 
(Langworthy and Travis 1999). Collectively, these considerations defend the view that police 
work is inevitably about the application of force, when needed. 
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 Far less agreement in the literature exists about how to understand the application of 
these police powers in police work. We review some of these postulations and evidence below. 
However it is important to note that, within the spectrum of use of force there are two situations 
which are deemed to be unequivocally undesirable; excessive use of force and unnecessary use 
of force. Either situation is argued to undermine and damage the police' relationship with the 
community (Ariel et al 2016b; Reiss 1968; Worden 1996). “Complaints about police conduct 
do not usually arise because police are apprehending burglars in the middle of the night, or 
robbers holding up a bank. Trouble arises out of social interaction...” (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993: 
97). Within this prism, it becomes effectively clear why any method by which excessive, non-
proportional or altogether unnecessary application of force can be reduced, would be a desired 
outcome.  
 Terrill (2001:14) explores several explanatory perspectives in the understanding of 
police use of force that he derives from the social science literature of the last 40 years. There 
are numerous cues which officers recognize, as well as countless interactions between these 
variables, that lead to the use of force (Terrill and Mastrofski 2002; Wikstrom et al 2012; 
Hickman et al, 2008; Garner et al 2002). Simply listing them, however, does not aid in 
explaining the use of force, although understanding their relevance to police actions is, 
nevertheless, important. Conceptually speaking, the broad range of variables that constitutes 
“use of force” can be categorized as situational, psychological and organizational. 
Situational cues can prompt officers to make assessments about how an incident should 
be handled and how much “force” should be applied (Sherman 1980; Black 1976; Ariel and 
Tankebe 2016). These cues might be the race, gender, age, demeanour, sobriety or mental state 
of the suspect. The ecological circumstances of the interaction play a part here, such as the 
neighbourhood in which the police and suspect interact, lighting, availability of CCTV, or the 
number of bystanders or officers involved. These cues can be considered the theatre in which 
the encounter takes place.  Reiss (1968) found that 78% of the time force occurred in police-
controlled settings, such as within the police vehicle, precinct or public streets; and in the 
majority of cases, there are no witnesses. Research has further expanded this view, suggesting 
it is the suspects’ actions and resistance during the encounter that precipitate the level of force 
used by officers (Alpert and Dunham 1997; Alpert et al, 2004; Terrill 2001). This is the 
‘demeanour hypothesis’ (see Engel, Sobol and Worden 2000; Worden and Shepard 1996; 
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Worden, Shepard and Mastrofski 1996), which is one of the leading predictors of police use of 
force.  
A psychological perspective suggests that it is the officers' personal characteristics, 
experiences, views, training and outlook, which determine the application of force (Terrill 
2001). There is evidence to suggest some officers are more aggressive in stressful situations 
whilst some officers show greater restraint when confronted by disrespectful conduct (Engel 
2000). In another study, aggressiveness and tough-minded characteristics in officers were 
predictors of greater use of force (Fabricatore et al 1978). Worden (1995) found that officers 
who were university graduates were more likely to use physical force. The wealth of research 
in this area suggests that psychological variables are important to any study of the use of force, 
but we recognize that this area is understudied. 
 Finally, research on use of force applied two predominant organizational theories to 
understand what may influence officers’ use of excessive or unnecessary force. Wilson (1968) 
proposed an organizational theory that reflects on the corporate structures and political 
environment of the time. The model suggests that officers will tend to act similarly to given 
situations due to organizational rules, regulations, standard operating procedures, incentives 
and top-down managerial models. A style of policing develops with a “common vision that 
becomes part of each officer’s mind-set of how to handle everyday aspects of policing” (Terrill 
2001:20).  Therefore, in agencies where there is an overall official acceptance to use more force 
against suspects (or specific types of suspects), more officers are more likely to exhibit this 
pattern of behaviour. The second theory looks at police subculture (Brown 1998; Skolnick 
2008; Baker 1985) and presumes that it allows officers to operate with some impunity, as there 
is tacit approval of their actions by colleagues and a reluctance to inform on what is seen as 
appropriate. Baker (1985) summarized this in his “hierarchy of wrongfulness”: “dead wrong; 
wrong, but not bad; wrong but everybody does it.” Some authors (Ariel et al 2014) have 
described this as being how officers see excessive or unnecessary force, but as Skolnick (2008) 
points out, officers are now more culturally diverse than in 1985, which may distort the 
neatness of this model. Either way, it seems clear that when considering use of force one cannot 
solely concentrate on officers and suspects, there needs to be consideration of the 
organizational environment in which they operate. 
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Measuring Police Use of Force 
When an officer uses “force”, he or she is nearly always required to file an official 
report, even if only in his or her pocketbook.  In many UK forces, the custody officer who is in 
charge of booking arrestees, is responsible for recording incidents of use of force as well, 
including any sustained injuries to suspects, as a result of the use of force. The challenge 
however, is that not every physical action on the part of an officer is considered “force.” The 
very definition can be subjective, memory-prone, generally unclear and primarily an 
intradepartmental measure. This suggests to us that the reporting of use of force is closely 
linked to police accountability and transparency. Sound reporting of accurate and full account 
use of force is the cornerstone of police accountability and is essential if officers are to be held 
responsible for their actions, regardless of whether or not those actions were justified. As 
reviewed by other scholars (Mastrofski 2002; Ransley, Anderson & Prenzler 2007; Stenning 
2009), police accountability refers to taking responsibility for the actions of the organization by 
tracking or measuring its outputs. This requirement demands that the police are accountable for 
their performance, and will amend it when necessary.  The police must act in the public’s 
interest, and are therefore assumed to be held to a higher degree of accountability than citizens 
– especially given the wide powers they hold in modern society (Bayley 1996; Skolnick and 
Fyfe 1993; Kupferberg 2008; Walsh 2001).  For this and other reasons, Walker 2007:5 (see 
also Walker and Archbold 2013:94) contends that: 
 
[T]he first accountability procedure to be considered involves the 
direction and control officer use of police authority through 
formal agency policies. This approach, generically known as 
administrative rulemaking, is a basic feature of modern police 
management, if not all public and private sector organizations. 
Administrative rulemaking consists of three elements: specifying 
approved and forbidden actions in written policies; requiring 
officers to file written reports on specific actions; requiring 
administrative review of officer reports.  
 
Some ethnographic work in this area (e.g., Hunt 1985; Rojek et al 2012) suggests that 
what is construed as a “reportable incident of force” and how much force is appropriate, is 
often predicated by a police department’s organizational culture. For example, police 
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subculture in relation to the reporting of use-of-force plays a role in accepting or allowing 
“force” to be applied in certain circumstances. Researchers who study police organizations 
have made the case for some time now that use-of-force and its subsequent reporting are a 
function of police officers’ attitudinal commitment to certain institutional or organizational 
cultures around their roles in society and, more broadly, their views of power (Terrill et al 
2003; Lester 1996).  Certain institutional and subcultural codes make police agencies 
particularly resistant to cultural changes and transparency requirements (Skolnick 2008:37).  
Feelings of loyalty sustain this code of silence and make it particularly difficult to investigate 
purported unnecessary, or excessive, use-of-force, especially when it goes unrecorded (Baker 
1985:210-213).  For example, placing one’s hand on another’s shoulder in an authoritative way, 
or using handcuffs, may be considered use-of-force in some instances and for some individuals, 
whereas for others they may not. Aggressive voice commends (shouting, cursing, and threats) 
can certainly be construed as “force” as well, however not all police forces hold the view that 
such commands are recordable acts of force. In similar ways, measuring “injury” or “assault” is 
also likely to be challenged in terms of definitional threshold, as it is open to interpretation 
when there are no clear signs of physical contact.  Taken collectively, we see that what needs to 
be reported, or not, is not always as clear-cut as it could be, yet it does form a direct and 
tangible aspect of police transparency. 
Recording issues also present problems when trying to identify the scope of use of force 
in policing. On the one hand, there seems to be an agreement that, in general, officers do not 
use force as often as the popular media usually suggests, since the majority of officers’ daily 
contacts are with law-abiding citizens (Alpert & Dunham 2004; Croft 1985; Fyfe 1988; Bayley 
& Garofolo 1989). On the other hand, there are organizational pressures and biases that mask 
the true levels of use of force prevalence, frequency and severity (Alpert and Smith 1999). 
Adams (1996:62) suggests use of force “happens twice as often” as is suggested by official 
reports, particularly “low level” use of force, such as verbal commands or simply taking hold of 
someone. Still, measuring what “police force” is, at which point it becomes excessive, 
unnecessary or disproportional (Worden 1996; Reiss 1968) – or even who instigates the use of 
force beyond what is required – is far from clear (Ariel et al 2016c). No tracking system of 
force is completely reliable and valid; the amount of “force” necessary in any given situation is 
subjective (Hickman, Piquero & Garner 2008).   
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Thus, police use of some force is an essential requirement against certain offenders, 
under specific circumstances. The ever-present challenge is to minimize the prevalence, 
frequency and severity of “force” to its minimal level, without putting officers’ lives at risk, 
whilst still allowing them to gain control in situations when “force” is required (Ariel et al. 
2016d). Enhancing proper recording of every force response, no matter at which “severity 
level” or category, would be an equally desired consequence of a professional agency. 
 
THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF BWC ON POLICE USE OF FORCE 
At this juncture, BWCs come in. The mechanism behind the hypothesized effect of BWCs on 
use of force is deterrence, driven by the awareness of observation (see Ariel et al. 2016e).  
There is a wealth of research dealing with how living creatures amend or change their 
behaviour when they think they are being watched (Chatrand and Bargh 1999; Dzieweczynski 
et al 2006; Wicklund 1975; Munger and Shelby 1989). A social-cognitive process is 
engendered by the belief, or awareness, of being under observation and is expressed by an 
increased desire to observe societal rules; this is often manifested by an observable increase in 
conformity to acceptable behaviour patterns (Gervais and Norenzayan 2012; Sproull et al 1996; 
Barclay 2004). People understand that rule breaking is a behaviour that can lead to sanctions, 
and is therefore something that should be avoided (Klepper and Nagin 2006; Nagin 2013a). 
Kahneman (2011) explains that although genuinely strict rationality in all decision-making is 
unobtainable by most people, it is nevertheless true that certain cues (even very small ones) that 
someone is watching, can lead to positive reactions and improved behaviour as non-compliant 
behaviour can lead to adverse consequences which, ultimately, rational actors wish to 
circumvent. 
In criminology, these notions are more widely studied within the framework of 
deterrence theory (see Ariel et al., 2016d). Deterrence theory dictates that the threat of 
apprehension is causally linked to more compliance and/or less rule breaking. Police officers 
and scholars equally assume that the threat of immediate incarceration, or at least interdiction, 
deters non-compliance. This model is believed to be universal, so it is expected to work on both 
suspects/offenders as well as police officers. As Durlauf and Nagin (2011:7) write, “for 
criminal decisions, what matters is the subjective probability a potential criminal assigns to 
apprehension” (see also Groff et al 2015). Nagin (2013a, 2013b), Loughran, Pogarsky, Piquero, 
The UK BWC RCT 
11 
 
and Paternoster (2012), and more recently Nagin, Solow and Lum (2015) have shown some of 
the necessary conditions in which deterrence exerts an effect on criminal decision-making, and 
the same can be said for officers who must comply with police regulations. Getting caught 
doing something morally or socially wrong is often registered as behaviour that can potentially 
lead to negative consequences, which is an outcome people often flight from. Studies have, 
nevertheless, uncovered a propensity to avoid negative outcomes, and findings generally agree 
that individuals react compliantly to even the slightest cues indicating that somebody may be 
watching: being watched is registered as an antecedent to a likely apprehension and therefore 
this awareness encapsulates a tangible deterrence effect (Dzieweczynski et al 2006). 
Thus, deterrence and the awareness of observation work equally on suspects who would 
otherwise decide to commit a crime and on police officers who might otherwise break the rules 
of conduct.  For this reason, BWCs are hypothesized to work simultaneously on both actors in a 
police-public encounter.  When officers and suspects are cognizant of the BWC, they are 
equally assumed to have no preference towards rule breaking, as the risk apprehension and 
conviction by the evidence captured on videotape is overwhelming. BWCs, unlike CCTV, 
dashboard cameras or bystanders’ mobile-phone cameras, can be viewed as “credible threats” 
(Jervis et al 1989:3; Nagin 2013a):  Parties in the interaction are conscious not only of the fact 
that they are being watched, but also of the consequences associated with non-compliance. 
“Getting-away” with rule breakzing is far less conceivable if one is being videotaped and one is 
conscious that the behaviour is in fact videotaped.  The evidence from the Rialto study supports 
this model.     
 
 
What We Know about BWC and the Rialto Experiment 
 There have been four literature reviews (Cubitt et al 2016; Lum et al 2015; Stratton et al 
2014; White 2014) published on BWCs, and since these publications, additional reports have 
been released from the Cambridge University replication studies (Ariel et al. 2016a, 2016b, 
2016c, 2016d).  If read together, cover the entire gamut of the research on BWCs to date. Of 
these, only but a handful randomized controlled trial (RCT) on the effectiveness of BWCs 
achieves the requirements of Level 5, in terms of its scientific rigor, on the Maryland Scientific 
Methods Scale (Sherman et al 1998). The first was a randomized controlled trial, known as the 
Rialto Experiment, looked at the effectiveness of BWCs in Rialto, California, with specific 
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focus on use of force and complaints. Rialto Police Department, a small jurisdiction in 
California with just over 50 frontline officers, compared nearly 500 police shifts during which 
all police-public encounters were equally assigned to either treatment or control conditions. 
During treatment shifts, Rialto officers were asked to videotape all their encounters with 
members of the public and to store evidence on a secured cloud.  In control shifts, the officers 
were tasked never to use the devices.  Outcomes were then measured, in terms of officially 
recorded use of force incidents and complaints lodged against Rialto police officers.  Following 
this 12-month experiment, Ariel, Farrar and Sutherland (2014) reported a relative reduction of 
roughly 50% in the total number of incidents of use-of-force compared to control conditions, 
and a 90% reduction in citizens’ complaints, compared to the 12-months prior to the 
experiment.  
The findings from the Rialto study have generated heated debates worldwide (Reddit 
24/12/14), particularly concerning the transferability of the findings to other jurisdictions, or to 
larger police departments (Miller et al 2014; NY Times 24/09/14). Questions have also been 
raised as to whether unique circumstances in Rialto jeopardized the external validity of the test 
(BenBrucato.com 3/12/14). Major metropolitan cities, and with them large law enforcement 
agencies, operate on a different scale to small or even medium sized forces (Regale et al 1989; 
Corner 1989; Weber-Brookes & Lieber-Piquero 1998). Likewise, whether or not these US 
findings are transferable abroad has also been raised.  White (2014:10) concluded that:  
[I]ndependent research on body-worn camera technology is urgently needed. 
Most of the claims made by advocates and critics of the technology remain 
untested . . . Researchers should examine all aspects of the implementation and 
impact of the technology—from its perceived civilizing effect, evidentiary 
benefits, and impact on citizen perceptions of police legitimacy to its 
consequences for privacy rights, the law enforcement agency, and other outside 
stakeholders.   
 
The Mesa study (Ready and Young) conducted an experiment with the Mesa, Arizona 
Police Department. The study analysed nearly 3,700 field reports completed by 100 sworn 
patrol officers. Random assignment of the officers into treatment and control groups have 
resulted in several important findings: first, officers that did not wear body worn videos were 
more likely to conduct stop and search, and were also more likely to make an arrest. This 
means that wearing BWCs may cause officers to be more cautious and risk-averse than control 
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conditions.   At the same time, treatment officers were more likely to give citations and initiate 
encounters. This suggests that BWCs may cause officers to be more proactive with this 
technology, however without increasing their use of invasive strategies that “may threaten the 
legitimacy of the organisation” (Ready and Young 2015: 445). 
 Finally, Jennings, Lynch and Fridell (2015) have also observed the effect of BWCs on 
policing, but focused particularly on response-to-resistance incidents. in their randomised 
experiment, they have used 46 officers who were randomly assigned to wear BWCs and 43 
officers who were randomly assigned to not wear BWCs. the study has shown that BWCs 
reduced these types of incidents and serious external complaints. The prevalence of response-
to-resistance incidents and the prevalence and frequency of serious external complaints were 
significantly less for officers randomly assigned to wear BWCs (p. 480).  
These three tests are all American. Experimental replications are also required in order 
to show whether its findings represent an US-centric anomaly attributable to the US contexts 
only, or due to the novelty of these devices in American police operations, or both.   
To be fair, noteworthy non-RCT studies, nevertheless, do exist on BWCs. The United 
Kingdom police forces were in fact the first to express an interest in BWCs.  The Plymouth 
Head Camera Project (Goodall 2007); the Grampian Police study (ODS Consulting 2011); 
Project Hyperion study in Hampshire (Ellis 2014) – all these Level 1 or 2 studies on the 
Maryland Scale offer some confirmation of the hypothesized effect of BWCs on the incidence 
of use of force. Although these non-controlled before-after studies did not look directly at use 
of force, they have nonetheless reported reductions in crime, fewer assaults on officers and 
improvements in criminal justice outcomes. At the same time, these studies suffer from risks to 
internal validity and their results are, consequently, suspect. Another recent evaluative report 
on BWCs, conducted in the county of Essex by The College of Policing (Owens et al 2014), 
has proved inconclusive due to challenges in the implementation of the experiment. The study 
was beset with detrimental implementation issues, such as low usage of the cameras, which 
damaged both its treatment integrity as well as internal validity and hence rendered the results 
obtained as challenging to interpret accurately. 
 
Missing Gaps in the Literature on BWCs 
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Beyond replications, there are two areas where the available research is lacking and requires a 
more granular analysis of the effect of BWCs on police use of force. Firstly, a coherent 
breakdown of what “force” means, beyond the dichotomous measure of self-reported use of 
force observed in previous studies, is needed and, secondly, a distinction between the compliant 
and non-compliant handcuffing of suspects, must be made and described.  
Not all Force Responses are Created Equal. Once BWCs are mandated in police 
operations, is there a reduction in the frequency and severity of the use of force? This question 
about the effects of BWCs on the use of force demands that a closer observation be made about 
the types of forces that officers are more, or less, likely to use when BWCs are present. 
Outcome variations are currently unclear. On the one hand, BWCs could also have an effect on 
any level of force the police use.  This implies that BWCs have an effect on all categories of 
force. On the other hand, the effect of BWCs might be located in the lower bands of what is 
referred to as the “force continuum” (for a more elaborate review, see Terrill 2001) – e.g., 
verbal commands, empty-hand submission techniques and some aggressive response 
techniques such as pepper spray or baton use. The force continuum is a standard that provides 
police officers with a guideline about how much “force” is appropriate against a resisting 
suspect, in different circumstances.  As such, and under this line of theorization on the effect of 
BWCs, BWCs are effective, but only up to the point where “force apparatus” such as 
intermediate weapons (TASER discharges), dogs or lethal force, are used. Put differently, 
BWCs would only have an effect in instances when the officer was able to convince the suspect 
to ‘step down’ using open-hand approaches, and therefore avoid the incremental use of force up 
to the point where these “force apparatus” are applied.   
To be sure, one should anticipate that some suspects are likely to be aggressive anyway, 
so more forceful responses would be deployed regardless of whether BWCs were present or 
not. To illustrate, deterrence relies heavily on rational calculations and awareness; for this 
reason, intoxicated or psychotic offenders are unlikely to be responsive to deterrent messages 
or the credible threat of punishment through their videotaped demeanour. These cases, which 
may anyway require extreme measures of police force, would be unsusceptible to the effect of 
BWCs. 
“Compliant” versus “Non-Compliant” Handcuffing.  The other crucial element, which 
has been ignored in previous BWC studies, is the distinction between arrests where the suspect 
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is handcuffed and “voluntarily” agreed to go to the station, or circumstances in which the 
suspect is handcuffed but involuntarily escorted to a police station for further questioning.  
From a procedural perspective, the use of handcuffs is not legally mandated (College of 
Policing 2013, 2015), and the suspect may in fact submit without the use of handcuffs. 
However, in practice – and particularly when patrol officers tour in solo formations – nearly all 
arrests should result in handcuffing of suspects, simply because this is the health and safety 
guidance given to officers (Home Office 2014). Whether or not this is good practice is not the 
issue here, but if these restraints are or are not recorded by the officer as “use of force”, they 
create a measurement bias that needs to be addressed. Departmental and jurisdictional guidance 
on whether or not these handcuffing practices constitute police “use of force” diverges, and 
different approaches thus emerge (e.g., see guidelines of West Yorkshire Police, 2011; Las 
Vegas MPD, 2011, Warwickshire PCC Office, 5/6/15).  
 Why are we placing so much attention on this seemingly technical aspect? Because 
measuring any handcuffing as a level of force that requires the officer to log a “use of force” 
report, or alternatively a policy that stipulates that compliant handcuffing is not use of force, 
but a non-compliant handcuffing is a recordable event, changes the result. Both would be 
considered “low level force”; but one would appear in police records designed to track these 
incidents, while in another record-keeping system it would not.  At the very least – and 
methodologically speaking – the two different tracking policies (Sherman 2013) create a 
comparability issue between forces. The disparities illustrate the implications on police 
accountability and particularly around the transparency and the reporting of use of force, which 
continuous to be a contentious area in policing (Lersch et al 2008; Pate et al 1993; Terrill 2001; 
Garner et al 2006; Wolf et al 2009). This problem is exacerbated when many forces, including 
West Midlands Police where the present study took place, have stopped requesting their 
officers to log use of force reports completely (West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner 
2014). The only forms of systematic tracking available in many police forces, across the United 
Kingdom, are through custody arrest records, or non-computerized pocketbooks, or particular 
force types such as TASER discharges or lethal weapons: 
 
31. There is no longer a requirement for officers to record a use of force on a 
separate form in relation to open hand techniques, CS spray and baton strikes. 
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Officers are instructed to record the detail of any incident, force used and the 
rationale supporting the application based on the NDM in their pocket notebooks.  
32. The decision to stop recording such data was taken in late 2010 after 
consultation with Force Health and Safety, Professional Standards and Operations 
and was ratified by Command Team. Form WG 433 (use of force form) was 
withdrawn to support the force aim of reducing bureaucracy and reducing 
repetition of data.  
33. Records are maintained on the deployment of firearms officers, TASER usage 
and police dog bites. 
 
THE BIRMINGHAM SOUTH BODY-WORN CAMERAS EXPERIMENT 
Experimental Settings 
 The trial was conducted with the Birmingham South Local Policing Unit (LPU) in the 
West Midlands Police (WMP) force area. Birmingham South is a largely residential area 
populated by roughly 286,000 residents from a wide range of socio-economic levels, but with a 
limited range of ethnicities in comparison to other areas of the West Midlands (Birmingham 
City Council 2015). The trial was a field randomized controlled trial (RCT) utilizing 46 
response officers, and ran over a period of six months between June and December 2014. To 
emphasize, however, the officers did not serve as the units of analysis. 
 
Unit of Analysis  
 Although ideally officers would have been randomized to treatment and control groups 
on a 50/50 basis, making the officer the unit of analysis, this was not practicable, operationally 
speaking but methodologically as well as. Whilst the majority of officers work in solo 
formations, operational need within emergency response units often requires ad hoc, double 
crewing when responding to more complicated incidents. This means that officers in the control 
group could have been ‘contaminated’ by responding to calls together with members of the 
treatment group. As the treatment is hypothesized to affect the interaction with members of the 
public, ‘control officers’ would have had their behaviours altered in response to the presence of 
their colleagues’ BWCs. At the very least, suspects and victims would behave differently when 
BWCs are present - even if only some officers are wearing them (e.g., Jennings et al 2015). To 
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use a medical analogy, this is similar to a clinical trial where both the treatment and control 
patients are sharing the same pill. 
A further consideration was the sample size. A sample size of only 46 officers would 
have possibly generate an underpowered study (Cohen 1988), or one that was “doomed to 
failure' (Clarke and Weisburd 1994:179). Increasing the number of officers was not a realistic 
aim for our study. Under these circumstances, a sample size of 46 officers would only just have 
been sufficient if we were looking to detect quite large effects (d=0.8) with a probability of 
0.05 and a power at 80%. Based on the available evidence (e.g., Ariel, Farrar & Sutherland 
2014; Ariel et al 2016b), the anticipated effect size of BWCs on use of force is small to 
medium (Cohen 1988). 
Instead, by making police temporal shifts (e.g., 07:00-17:00 shift) the unit of analysis – 
much like the original Rialto study (Ariel, Farrar & Sutherland 2014) and as designated in its 
experimental protocol (Ariel and Farrar 2012), the sample size available can be increased 
significantly, therefore allowing for a much smaller effect size to be detected (Cohen 1988). As 
we ran the trial for 26 weeks, we were able to randomly assigned 430 shifts into treatment and 
control conditions (with a 50/50 split). Using G*Power (Faul et al 2007), this sample size was 
sufficient to detect a smaller effects (d=0.3; Cohen 1988) with a probability of 0.05 and a 
power at 80%.   
Admittedly, this method might still have produced some residual contamination from 
the treatment groups being carried into the control shift. The same officers either used BWCs or 
did not use BWCs in treatment and control shifts, respectively. There is the potential that 
behavioural modifications due to treatment conditions ‘carried through’ into control conditions. 
If BWCs effect behaviour, then there may be a learning mechanism at play, where officers 
adapted their overall behaviour (and possibly attitudes), and this broader change affected 
control conditions as well. At the same time, the degree of contamination is more limited (than 
using officers as the unit of analysis, for instance), because at least the spill over does not 
directly affect those that the police interact with: suspects, victims and witnesses. From a 
theoretical perspective, BWCs have at least as much of an effect on citizens as they do on 
officers. Therefore, if there is a spill over effect of the intervention, it is specific to one party 
only.as such, this design allows us to be in a better position to characterise SUTVA violations 
(see Sampson 2010). Ultimately, given the rule of maximin (Rawls 1971) and the inherent 
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operational policing pressures, shift randomization was deemed the best possible option, for 
these circumstances. For further methodological discussions about temporal shifts as a unit of 
analysis in policing studies, see Ariel, Farrar and Sutherland (2014) as well as Ariel et al 
(2016d). 
 
 
Random Allocation Procedure  
The random allocation of shifts was provided to the sergeants on a weekly basis using 
the Cambridge Randomizer (Ariel, Villa and Sherman 2012), on a pseudo-randomization basis 
with 1:1 allocation of day and night shifts, including days of the week (Table 1). No baseline 
significant differences emerged (χ2=17.50; p=.354). These treatment and control shift 
sequences were communicated to the patrol officers, who would be deployed to patrol with or 
without the BWCs. Over the course of the six months trial, 215 shifts were allocated to 
treatment and 215 to control conditions. 
------------------ 
Table 1 Here 
------------------ 
 
Treatment and Experimental Procedure 
The trial began with a two-week exploratory test, so the officers could familiarize themselves 
with the equipment, the design of the experiment and the various processes involved.  
Technical problems were also resolved during this period. Once the RCT commenced and the 
random allocation sequence was communicated to the teams, then while on treatment shifts 
officers were issued cameras, whereas while on control shifts the cameras remained in the 
police station.  
Additional details of the trial procedures can be found in our pre-trial experimental 
protocol (see Supplementary Materials A). However, we highlight two important aspects of the 
procedure. First, during every beginning of a shift, the officer in charge was responsible for 
assuring treatment integrity (e.g., gearing all patrolling officers with BWCs on treatment shifts, 
and making sure that officers were not going on patrols wearing BWCs during control shifts). 
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On treatment shifts, constables wearing BWCS would go out on patrol, and record their 
interactions with suspects, arrestees, victims and witnesses, based on the experimental protocol. 
At the end of each shift, the officers returned to the station and docked the cameras in a 
specially designated room. The docking procedure uploaded the evidence into storage and 
charged the battery of the camera.  
Second, the treatment included not only the wearing of BWCs during all encounters 
between police and members of the public, but prior to any interaction officers were requested 
to announce the presence and use of the camera. As more fully elaborated on in Ariel et al 
(2016a, 2016b), the verbal communication was hypothesised to create a deterrent effect against 
both officers as well as suspects. In addition, the particular type of camera used in this trial 
included a front-facing screen, which the party that interacts with the police office can see 
himself or herself whilst the camera is turned on (see Picture 1 below). 
 
-------------------- 
Picture 1 Here 
-------------------- 
 
Manipulation Checks 
Treatment integrity was checked by a police inspector on a daily basis, to ascertain that 
the random allocation sequence was preserved. These daily supervisor’s reviews, including 
regular checks of the officers' data uploads, revealed 99% compliance with random allocation, 
in both treatment and control conditions. In practice, treatment integrity was continuously 
measured, and any miss-assignments that occurred during the trial were immediately dealt with 
and therefore nearly never reoccurred.
 1
 Furthermore, an Inspector also routinely randomly dip-
sampled custody records and informed officers that such a procedure was put in place, thus 
ensuring that officers were continuously aware that an auditing exercise was maintained. These 
manipulation checks were put in place so that treatment fidelity is maintained, and that reported 
use of force was accurately recorded as well.  
                                               
1
 46 officers * 430 shifts = 19,780 officers’ shifts, however excluding rest days (known prior to random 
assignment), the actual total amount of officers shifts randomly assigned into the experimental arms were 18,224. 
Of those, mis-assignment was detected in 182 officers’ shifts, over the course of 26 weeks. 
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Variables  
 Crimes and calls for service data for the study were recorded by West Midlands Police, 
in accordance with Home Office Counting Rules (Home Office 2014). In order to recover the 
data required for the study, a police software program called Discoverer 4i, a standard tool used 
by West Midland Police analysts to harvest data from all police systems, was utilized. 
Discoverer 4i was particularly useful in determining whether arrests were made during 
treatment or control shifts. 
As noted in our review, systematic recordings of incidents of use of force are not 
routinely captured by most UK forces, and West Midlands Police is no different. An initial 
consideration, that of returning to the manual recording of use of force forms, by officers, was 
vetoed due to well-documented difficulties in maintaining this process and bias in recording 
from officers (Alpert and Smith 1999:63). Systematic social observations were outside the 
scope of the RCT as well. Instead, independent recordings of use of force do routinely take 
place in the arrest custody suite, by the custody officer.  These records are kept in custody 
recording system, or “ICIS”. The custody officer is legally required to register, among other 
details, what type of force was used by the arresting officer. To emphasize, the independent 
custody officer captured this information following an interview s/he conducts with both the 
arrestee as well as the arresting officer. This short survey includes questions about injuries 
sustained by the arrestee, whether s/he is ill, etc. See Supplementary Materials B for a template 
of the electronic form that custody officers complete for every ‘booking’. 
Specifically for use of force, the custody officer’s report includes a record of each 
category, which mimics the force continuum: (1) verbal commands, (2) compliant handcuffs, 
(3) physical restraint/forcible handcuffs, (4) CS Spray, (5) baton and (6) Taser. Note that in this 
recording policy there is a clear distinction between compliant and forcible handcuffing by the 
arresting officer.  
 
Statistical Procedures  
With the data, we had two binary variables that each had only two possible levels 
(counts of observations at each level), displayed in a 2 X 2 binary proportions table. Therefore, 
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we used Odds Ratios (“OR”) to assess the differences and to compare the responses (Y: the 
outcome variables) according to the value of the explanatory variable (X: BWC or controls). 
We therefore used the total arrest counts as the denominator (post-random assignment) and the 
number of force events within the post-treatment period as the numerator, and computed the 
OR. We also measured 95% confidence internals associated with these point estimates.  
We run two statistical models for these main effects. First, we observed the treatment 
effect on all force categories lumped together as ‘either or’ variable (as in all previous BWCs 
experiments). Second, we modelled the treatment effect after removing from the dependent 
variables ‘compliant handcuffing’ as a use-of-force category, for the reasons we explained 
above.  
Next, we carried out this procedure several times, for each type of use of force 
response: (a) physical restraints, (b) non-compliant handcuffs, (c) batons, (d) CS, (e) TASER 
drawn, (f) TASER used, and (g) Police dogs. To emphasise, these are official categories of 
force responses in West Midlands Police. Therefore, these should not be considered as 
exploratory secondary analyses (Assman et al, 2000).   
Finally, accepting that “force responses” move up on the force continuum as the level of 
force applied to the subject increases, several force types could be applied in each case. It is not 
rare for officers to use both physical restraints, with handcuffs and potentially TASER 
discharge as well, “against” the same combatant suspect. Therefore, we computed an overall 
weighted score, based on the cumulative ordinal position of each tactic, using a scale based on 
the force continuum scale, where “1” is assigned to compliant handcuffing and up to “8” for the 
use of a police dog (Table 3). The weighted scores were then used as dependent variables of the 
effect of BWCs.  
Notice that we place emphasis on effect sizes, rather than statistical significance testing, 
given the growing awareness in scientific papers that that treatments should be evaluated based 
on the impact rather than the .05 alpha criterion. Effect sizes provide a more substantive answer 
to the efficacy question of any intervention. As recently commented by the editorial unit of the 
Cochrane Collaboration (2014), “results should not be reported as statistically significant or 
statistically non-significant [as] the cut-off point of 5% is arbitrary… In general, point 
estimates and confidence intervals, when possible…should be used to describe effects based on 
the size of the effect and the quality of the evidence.”  Uman (2011:57) noted that: 
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“In contrast to traditional hypothesis testing which can give us information about 
statistical significance (i.e., did the intervention group differ from the control group) 
but not necessarily clinical significance (i.e., was this difference clinically meaningful 
or large), effect sizes measure the strength of the relationship between two variables, 
thereby providing information about the magnitude of the intervention effect (i.e., 
small, medium, or large). 
In tune with this growing line of methodological approach, we also focused on the magnitude 
of the differences between BWCs conditions and non-BWCs conditions, rather than p-values, 
but present the associated 95% confidence intervals. For a more in depth read on these 
methodological issues, see Fan & Konold (2010), Greenland et al (2016), Kirk (2001), Thomas, 
Salazar & Landers (1991), Ziliak & McCloskey (2008, 2016).  
 
 
RESULTS 
As noted, during the course of the six months, 215 shifts were randomly allocated to 
treatment and 215 to control, totalling 18,224 officer hours. Four hundred and five individual 
incidents of police use of force were recorded in Birmingham South, out of a cohort of 590 
arrests (270 arrests during treatment conditions and 320 during control conditions). Overall, 
there were 224 incidents of use of force recorded when cameras were not present and 181 when 
cameras were. However, once “compliant handcuffs” were excluded, 56 and 106 incidents of 
use of force were recorded in treatment and control conditions, respectively (Figure 1). 
 We tested for the comparability of these arrests. The assignment of officer-shifts to 
experimental and control condition was random, fewer arrests are made during treatment (270) 
than during control conditions (320). We therefore tested whether different conditions and 
situations emerged during treatment versus control arrests, beyond the question of use of force. 
Our analyses (Table 2) indicate that the differences in arrests can be attributed to random 
variations in the data. As shown, the situations that led to arrests were not statistically 
significantly different – in terms of time of day, day of week, prevalence of drunk suspects, or 
possession of drugs.  Likewise, we found no statistically significant concentrations of any type 
of condition ‘within’ officers (χ2(195)=228.1; p<.05); see Supplementary Materials C). 
 
------------------ 
Table 2 Here 
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Model I: overall effects with compliant handcuffs - The odds for use of force per arrests 
when BWCs are present compared to BWCs not-present conditions are about 14% lower, 
ranging between 43% lower and 29% greater odds compared to the odds of use of force under 
control conditions. These results are not significantly different {OR = .856; 95% CI .567, 
1.292}. 
Model II: overall effects without compliant handcuffs - The odds for use of force 
incident per arrests under the second model are about 48% and significantly lower {OR = .523; 
95% CI .339, .807}. Put differently, the odds of a use of force incident beyond compliant 
handcuffing, when BWCs are not present, are double than when BWCs are present. 
 
------------------ 
Figure 1 Here 
------------------ 
 
Table 3 below lists the raw number of use of force incidents, by type. Notice that the 
number of use of force “types” exceeds the prevalence counts (240 in treatment and 334 in 
control conditions), since more than one type of force can be applied in the same forceful 
encounter (i.e., a combination of several force responses “against” the same suspect). 
 
------------------ 
Table 3 Here 
------------------ 
 
The pre-specified breakdown of police use of force categories (Fig. 2) indicates 
substantial differences in physical restraint and non-compliant handcuffing, as well as in terms 
of compliant handcuffs. However, the directionality of these effects is reversed. BWCs seem to 
lower the odds of physical restraints by 52% {OR=.476; 95% CI .304, .754} and non-compliant 
handcuffing by 49% {OR=.507; 95% CI .319, .805}. On the other hand BWCs seem to 
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increase the odds of compliant handcuffing by nearly 40% {OR=1.405; 95% CI .961 – 2.055, 
p=.079}
2
, compared to control conditions.  
 
 
------------------ 
Figure 2 Here 
------------------ 
 
Looking more closely at other force responses, we note that categories of police use of 
force above physical restraint represent only 5% of total police use of force in this sample (Fig. 
2). If these results are indicative, they tend to suggest that BWCs increase the odds of force 
responses (Fig. 2); however, these conclusions are suspect, given their low rates of occurrence.   
 Finally, in terms of the cumulative use of force scores (see Table 4 and Fig. 3), there is, 
in comparing treatment and control conditions, a significant increase in the ordinal position of 
force when the data is arranged as a weighted, cumulative score. Our estimates suggest a 35% 
reduction of overall weighted force in the treatment conditions compared to control conditions.  
 
------------------------------------- 
Table 4 and Figure 3 Here 
-------------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this experiment, we robustly tested the effect of BWCs in non-US settings, with one of the 
UK’s largest police forces. Over a six-month period, using the officers’ shifts as the unit of 
analysis, we have contributed to the evidence in three major ways. First, we demonstrated that 
the use of BWCs in police operations reduces both the prevalence and the severity of police use 
of force, in a country where police use of force is substantially less lethal than it is in countries 
like the United States (Sherman 24/2/2015). This suggests that when the police use BWCs, 
police use of force can be curbed down in “aggressive” police-public contacts that do not 
involve life-threatening situations, for both officers as well as suspects.  
                                               
2
 See Sherman and Weisburd (1995:637) for a justification for more relaxed p-value criteria in policing 
experiments 
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Perhaps more importantly, our study exemplifies the importance granular analysis of 
pre-specified outcome variations (see Ariel & Farrington 2010). Overall, our weighted 
dependent variable, which captures any type of force response, shows a 35% reduction in the 
use of force, compared to control conditions. However, the findings suggest that BWCs can be 
shown to be more efficient when recording force in one way, but not in another. The way force 
is defined is crucial: when “police use of force” includes what the professional literature refers 
to as “compliant handcuffing” of suspects – meaning the ordinary handcuffing of arrestees 
when transporting them to jail – then our overall estimated effects are non-significant and 
weaker. However, when the definition of “police use of force” excludes such handcuffing, the 
odds for force responses were cut in half compared to control conditions.  
Moreover, once we break down “force” into its components, we are then able to 
characterize the effect in more specific terms. Our findings suggest that the overall pooled 
effect on use of force is driven by low-level force categories, rather than more aggressive 
tactics. We first show that BWCs increases compliant handcuffing. We then show that the odds 
for physical restraints and non-compliant handcuffs were lower with BWCs than control 
conditions. Next, our data illustrate that the odds for using more combative force responses, 
such as batons, TASER, or police dogs, were nonsignificant and therefore the effect is 
presently unclear. Thus, there is a distinct change when moving from 'empty handed' 
techniques to ones where ‘force tools’ are used. This suggests that once the level of force 
reaches the rare, but elevated levels of force, the effect of BWCs is less discernible.  However, 
given the nonsignificant results in these upper force categories – a finding which is likely to 
emerge due to the small number of overall incidents that officers in Birmingham South applied 
such tactics – more research is required before reaching firm conclusions on the effects of 
BWCs in these types of force.   
 
Interpreting the Effect of BWCs on Compliant Handcuffing 
The granular analysis of the dependent variable – police use of force – indicated 40% 
greater odds for compliant handcuffs when BWCs were used compared to the odds under 
control conditions. This is the opposite of what we have detected for noncompliant handcuffing 
(51% reduction). How can these contradictory results, in terms of compliant and non-compliant 
handcuffing, be explained? If BWCs are meant to deter, under what circumstances might they 
The UK BWC RCT 
26 
 
actually increase the prevalence of use of force, rather than decrease it? An increase in use of 
force is counterintuitive to the hypothesized effect of BWCs. It goes against the premise of 
deterrence theory, which can potentially explain the effects of BWCs. We offer three 
interpretations. 
1. BWCs create unintended consequences. On the one hand, it is possible that wearing a BWC 
intensifies, rather than lowers, the tension between some officers and some suspects. If this is 
the case, officers may have to apply compliant handcuffs more frequently when BWCs are in 
use because the devices trigger aggression, for particular suspects. Under these circumstances, 
the handcuffs are used pre-emptively. For instance, the cameras can make certain suspects 
verbally abusive or hostile towards the officer (though not physical), and so the officer 
immediately responds with compliant handcuffs without which he would have to resort to 
tougher force responses. To emphasize, the officer would not have to resort to tougher force 
responses and consequently to use pre-emptive handcuffing, if BWCs were not present. 
There is some general evidence to support this argument: use of force does not occur in 
isolation and, ordinarily, police officers use force as a reaction to the demeanour of the suspect 
(Rojek et al 2012, Terrill & Mastrofski 2002; Garner et al 2002; Alpert and Dunham 1997; 
Alpert et al, 2004; Terrill 2001). Officers are trained to match appropriate force against subject 
resistance, and they would move up the force continuum along with the way that the suspect 
exhibited such behaviour (College of Policing 2013). However, the key is the officer’s 
perception that more force is appropriate under the circumstances. Therefore, as the only 
difference between treatment and control conditions is the presence of BWC, then we could 
draw the conclusion that, in order to gain control of situations that may otherwise end up with 
more severe types of force responses, officers understood the encounter as one that merits the 
use of compliant handcuffing. 
On the other hand, the unintended consequences explanation does not fully expound 
why we measured a substantial decrease in the odds for ordinary use of force categories while 
the odds for compliant handcuffing rates increased.  If officers use compliant handcuffs at 
increasing rates during control conditions because they pre-empt assault against them, this 
could mean that BWCs may reduce overall use of force, but at the same time increase the 
likelihood of assaults against officers. This suggests that BWCs are potentially backfiring in 
terms of assaults against the police, and WMPs officers have found a way to deal with it: to 
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increase the rates of pre-emptive handcuffs of arrestees. Therefore, the overall results mask a 
more complicated story: under certain conditions and for some suspects, BWCs increase rather 
than decrease levels of aggression, and a way to operationally deal with this problem is to place 
these suspects in handcuffs, before they turn this aggression into violence. How officers are 
able to predict which suspects are more likely to assault them (e.g., drugged offenders), or 
whether in fact there are case types that require these compliant handcuffs (e.g., domestic 
assaults), remains unclear at this stage
3
, and more research is needed at this granular level. 
2. Transparency and Accountability.  A more parsimonious interpretation would suggest that 
the increase in the use of compliant handcuffs is simply a reporting artefact. With the new 
BWCs policy, officers (including the custody officers) began logging compliant handcuffs 
more diligently under the treatment conditions. Ariel (2016) contextualizes this pattern within 
the police accountability and transparency literature. In this regard, accurate and full reporting 
of use of force is a clear marker of enhanced accountability; democratic institutions must hold 
their functionaries responsible for their actions, justified or otherwise, so we require from them 
better recordings (Walker & & Archbold 2013; Skonick & Fyfe 1993).  
Once BWCs are mandated in police operations, reporting of use of force incidents 
increases, especially where they are normally underreported. This is less of an issue with more 
severe force responses, as it is very unlikely that a TASER discharge, the use of batons or 
police dogs could go unreported in large western police departments. However, lower bound 
force responses are easier to conceal, and even more so if there is no legal requirement to report 
them - such as compliant handcuffing or voice commands. Thus, officers in the treatment group 
began registering these incidents at increased rates per arrests, compared to control conditions. 
What once was left to ad hoc explanations by officers who did not record “lesser” types of 
force, now can no longer be hidden from the radar.  
If this transparency mechanism is at play behind the increased in the odds of reporting 
compliant handcuffing, then we can conclude that BWCs have caused officers to become more 
                                               
3
 Legal advice comes from the ACPO Guidance on the use of Handcuffs (2010:5): “In establishing an objective 
basis for believing that a person may escape or attempt to escape, an officer or member of police staff may reach 
to whatever the person says or does, but need not wait for a physical act […] In establishing an objective basis for 
believing that a person should be handcuffed because violence is likely to be used against the officer, member of 
police staff or a member of the public, the officer or member of police staff need not wait for a physical act from 
the person.”   
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accountable. The likelihood of “getting caught” using this type of lesser force – now on 
videotape – has substantially increased. As a result, the rates of reporting went up.  
 3. ‘Regimented Police Behaviour’. An alternative explanation, which fits comfortably within 
the construct of deterrence theory, is that the increase in compliant handcuffing is an 
unintended consequence of “being observed”. As the awareness of being scrutinized and 
observed generally evokes a measurably favourable shift in behaviour (see our review above), 
it is conceivable that the increase of compliant handcuffing indicates that officers follow the 
rules of police conduct prescriptively.  This means that the officer with BWCs is acting 
regimentally, in a 'policeman-like' behaviour, which includes the handcuffing of arrestees. This 
is an adverse consequence, because it removes the need to show that the handcuffing was 
“reasonable, necessary and proportionate” because now the arrest event itself is construed as 
“the objective basis for the decision to apply handcuffs” (ACPO Guidance 2010).  
 At the same time, this mechanism can be construed as a desired consequence. We want 
our officers to follow rules. The increased odds of handcuffing under treatment conditions can 
be interpreted as a fairer policy: to handcuff every arrestee, with limited discretion to decide if 
the arrest warrants handcuffing or not. This can be seen as the essence of a distributive fairness 
approach (Tankebe 2013).  
 
Policy Implications 
There is a wealth of studies suggesting that legitimate police use of force contributes to 
a wider public acceptance of the legitimacy of policing (Mawby 2002, Goldsmith 2005, 
Manning 2010; Reiner 2010). Some incidents of police use of force can irreparably damage the 
police/public contract, leading to catastrophic outpourings of violence against the state. The 
Dallas shootings of 07/07/2016 are examples thereof. These may only represent a tiny fraction 
of one percent of the number of times officers use force on members of the public, and the 
intimate details of why and how the incident flared-up into violence is not always captured in 
third party recordings because the confrontation does not excite public interest until it becomes 
heated. These kinds of conflicts demand rules for the police officer but none for the citizen 
(Vunak, 2001) and so invariably resemble a street brawl. Video footage of these kinds of events 
strongly influence the level of the community's trust and confidence and may become a catalyst 
for what was seen in the UK in 2011 and in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014. If BWCs indeed lessen 
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the incidence of police use of force, or at least some forms of it. The ramifications of a 
lessening of the use of force cannot be underestimated.   
Over a number of years, there have been numerous attempts to inhibit police 
misconduct, from policy changes and training through to civilian oversight committees. Mostly 
these have been ineffective (Walker 2005). The question of whether, and how much, force is 
used, one that requires decision making during police-public encounters, is the most difficult 
police behaviour to influence (Chan 1997, 1999; Ericson 2007). Our study has shown there is 
an effective tool for accomplishing this, with BWCs. 
Finally, it is important to ensure that an efficient BWC policy is adopted by police 
departments. One major element of such policy would be strict guidelines in which officers will 
be required to announce the presence of the camera. This may fit legal requirements about 
recording interactions with members of the public, but more importantly in order to materialize 
the deterrence threat.  If the reading of the Caution or Miranda Rights warning is required in 
order to echo the rights of the suspect to protect against involuntary self-incrimination (UK 
officers must give notice of arrest and the crime as soon as reasonably possible; College of 
Policing, 2015; US Supreme Court 13/05/1991); then a BWC policy must include a clear 
warning as soon as operationally feasible. It is a combination of this awareness and recognition 
of the technology that changes behaviours, practically as well as legally, and a sound policy 
should secure the theoretical mechanisms with such an immediate warning. 
 
Limitations of Study 
This study has been conducted on a relatively small scale with only 46 officers, albeit 
there were 430 shifts randomized to control and treatment. We measured ‘only’ 19 arrests that 
used higher levels of force, which has made it difficult to provide stronger estimates of the 
treatment effects.  Only a much larger or longer study would be able to detect smaller effects, 
for these less frequent events. We invite further research to consider this possibility. 
This study has also ignored the actual conflict point in these scenarios. There is still no 
robust understanding of the demeanour hypothesis as it pertains to BWCs (see Ariel et al 2014; 
Jennings et al 2015). There was no opportunity to either review the recorded footage of each 
incident, or interview the parties involved. Even if access was granted to the footage, observing 
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recorded footage clearly would be observational and partial only, as we cannot view incidents 
during control conditions. This leaves us speculating, whether the camera operates on one or 
both of the parties involved, and whether the cameras affect the officers’ behaviour and then 
affecting the offender, or the opposite direction.  There may be a double effect. We simply do 
not know. It would be very difficult, time consuming and expensive to study the mechanism at 
play in these conflict scenarios, but it could be a valid direction for future research.   
  
CONCLUSIONS 
Any level of force exercised by the police over the public can strain relations and “a single 
critical incident can have deleterious consequences” (Jefferis et al 1997:392). Technology can 
help reduce the need for force, and the BWC offers such a medium. Experimental evidence 
from Birmingham South shows that BWCs reduce the odds of use of force in arrests by about 
50%, which echoes the findings found in the Rialto Experiment. However, this replicated result 
was only achieved when we removed from the use of force measure compliant handcuffs. 
Future studies will be required to pay closer attention to the way force is defined, as the effect 
of BWCs is conditional on the way “force” is operationalized – with compliant handcuffs 
versus without compliant handcuffs, open handed versus force apparatus, etc. Our test shows 
that the treatment effect is concentrated in the lower bounds of the force continuum, with a 
non-significant effect on more aggressive force categories. BWCs seem to increase 
accountability and transparency, particularly on those police responses for which there is no 
requirement to log reports.  
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TABLE AND FIGURES 
 
 
Table 1: Baseline Comparability of Shifts: Treatment vs. Control 
  Treatment Control 
Monday 21 19 
Tuesday 17 21 
Wednesday 18 22 
Thursday 19 19 
Friday 16 22 
Saturday 16 20 
Sunday 21 17 
Total Shifts 128 140 
  
 
Table 2: Treatment vs. Control Arrest Conditions 
 
 Treatment 
(n=270) 
Control 
(C=320) 
Chi-Square / T-
test scores 
Percent weekend 
123 151 
χ2=35.00^ 
45.6% 47.2% 
Mean Time of Arrest 13:05 12:28 t=1.370 
Count/Percent of suspects reported drunk 
110 126 
χ2=6.00 
40.70% 39.40% 
Count/Percent of cases with drugs in possession 
47 49 
χ2=2.00 
21.10% 15.30% 
*  
p<.05; 
** 
p<.01;  
^ 
day of week X arrest cross-tabulation   
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Table 3: Use of Force Pre-Specified Categories – Treatment vs. Control Conditions 
 Treatment Rate per arrests Control Rate per arrests 
Compliant Handcuffs 136 0.5037 134 0.4188 
Physical Restraint 49 0.1815 101 0.3156 
Non-compliant Handcuffs 45 0.1667 90 0.2812 
Baton 0 -- 0 -- 
CS Spray 1 0.0037 2 0.0063 
Taser Drawn 7 0.0259 4 0.0125 
Taser Used 2 0.0074 2 0.0063 
Police Dog 0 0.0000 1 0.0031 
 
 
Table 4: Cumulative Use of Force Weights - Treatment vs Control conditions 
 Counts  Weighted Scores Cumulative Scores  
 Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control 
Compliant handcuffing (1)^ 136 134 136 134 136 134 
Physical Restraint (2) 49 101 98 202 234 336 
Non-compliant handcuffing (3) 45 90 135 270 369 606 
Baton (4) 0 0 0 0 369 606 
CS (5) 1 2 5 10 374 616 
Taser - drawn (6) 7 4 42 24 416 640 
Taser - used (7) 2 2 14 14 430 654 
Police Dog (8) 0 1 0 8 430 662 
^ Score in parentheses, based on the police use of force continuum 
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Figure 3 - Cumulative Scores 
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Picture 1: RevealMedia© Front-Facing Body Worn Camera  
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS A 
(Attached pre-trial protocol) 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS B 
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS C 
 
Officer Arrest with BWCs 
Arrest without 
BWCs 
Total Arrests Proportion 
BWCs : no-
BWCs ratio 
Officer 1 1 3 4 1% 33% 
Officer 2 12 13 25 4% 92% 
Officer 3 12 10 22 4% 120% 
Officer 4 5 10 15 3% 50% 
Officer 5 4 3 7 1% 133% 
Officer 6 0 1 1 0% 0% 
Officer 7 10 15 25 4% 67% 
Officer 8 2 2 4 1% 100% 
Officer 9 7 12 19 3% 58% 
Officer 10 4 6 10 2% 67% 
Officer 11 4 3 7 1% 133% 
Officer 12 7 4 11 2% 175% 
Officer 13 6 2 8 1% 300% 
Officer 14 9 9 18 3% 100% 
Officer 15 8 11 19 3% 73% 
Officer 16 6 10 16 3% 60% 
Officer 17 1 2 3 1% 50% 
Officer 18 5 1 6 1% 500% 
Officer 19 5 7 12 2% 71% 
Officer 20 2 1 3 1% 200% 
Officer 21 1 2 3 1% 50% 
Officer 22 2 6 8 1% 33% 
Officer 23 7 12 19 3% 58% 
Officer 24 4 7 11 2% 57% 
Officer 25 9 5 14 2% 180% 
Officer 26 8 7 15 3% 114% 
Officer 27 5 3 8 1% 167% 
Officer 28 6 12 18 3% 50% 
Officer 29 5 10 15 3% 50% 
Officer 30 14 10 24 4% 140% 
Officer 31 5 9 14 2% 56% 
Officer 32 0 1 1 0% 0% 
Officer 33 9 11 20 3% 82% 
Officer 34 5 2 7 1% 250% 
Officer 35 0 2 2 0% 0% 
Officer 36 1 0 1 0% -100% 
Officer 37 7 8 15 3% 88% 
Officer 38 7 11 18 3% 64% 
Officer 39 1 1 2 0% 100% 
Officer 40 5 5 10 2% 100% 
Officer 41 8 12 20 3% 67% 
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Officer Arrest with BWCs 
Arrest without 
BWCs 
Total Arrests Proportion 
BWCs : no-
BWCs ratio 
Officer 42 4 5 9 2% 80% 
Officer 43 2 0 2 0% -200% 
Officer 44 4 6 10 2% 67% 
Officer 45 8 9 17 3% 89% 
Officer 46 10 10 20 3% 100% 
Officer 47 16 14 30 5% 114% 
Officer 48 3 11 14 2% 27% 
Officer 49 4 4 8 1% 100% 
Total 270 320 590   
 
χ2(195)=228.1; p<.05 
 
